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ABSTRACT
THE KINEMATICS OF INTENT:
A NEW APPROACH TO MEASURING INTENTION IN INFANTS
MAY 2002
LAURA J. CLAXTON, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF OREGON CLARK HONORS COLLEGE
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Rachel K. Clifton
Previous studies have shown that what an adult is going to do with an object after they pick it
up affects the kinematics of the reach toward the object. This phenomenon has been referred
to in terms of movement intent (e.g., Martemuk, MacKenzie, Jeannerod, Athenes, and Dugas,
1987) and in terms of motor behavior context effects, (e.g., Johnson, McCarty, Clifton,
submitted). The aim of this study was to examine whether future actions influence the
kinematics of infants' approach toward an object. Twenty-one 10.5-month old infants were
encouraged to reach for and grasp a ball m order to fit it down a tube, throw it, or hold it.
Kinematic measures of the approach phase of the reach toward the ball were obtained using a
motion analysis system (Northern Digitial OPTOTRAK). While we were unable to fully
replicate the adult studies, we did find some kinematic differences in the reaches of infants
depending on what they were going to do with the ball after they picked it up. We found that
infants reached for the ball faster if they were going to subsequently throw the it as opposed to
fit it down a tube. In addition, infants had a significantly shorter reach duration time for those
reaches followed by a second action (fitting/throwing) than for those reaches followed by no
planned second action (holding). In all conditions the perceptual aspects of the ball to be
grasped were the same and cannot account for these kinematic differences. These results
suggest that 10.5-month old infants are planning their actions in advance and that this
intentional state can be quantified by examining the kinematics of the reach.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A wide range of research has delved mto the issue of whether or not infants perform
intentional behaviors, hi this research, there is controversy m what is meant by the term
intentionality and m what is the best methodology to assess this mtentionality in mfants.
While the primary focus of the current study was to find a unique methodology by which to
measure intentionality in infants, the terminology surrounding intentionality must be
addressed as well.
The controversy over what is meant by the phrase "intentional behavior in infants-
extensive and complex, in part, because of the differmg levels of complexit)' used to define
intention. We conceptualized intentionality as a continuum in which the complexity of
cognitive processes involved to perform the intentional actions varied. At one end of the
continuum is prospective control in which the infant must plan a single movement, the
movement toward the object he/she wishes to reach (von Hofsten, 1993). hi order to exhibit
prospective control, the infant must provide evidence that he/she was planning in advance to
reach for a particular object and not simply sticking out his/her hand randomly and
encountering an object by chance. One example providing evidence of prospective conhol in
infants is the observation that infants will start to reduce the grip size of their hand in
anticipation of an encounter with an object (von Hofsten and Ronnqvist, 1988). This kind of
evidence suggests that the infant was planning to reach for a particular object in that he/she
was adjusting his/her reach in order to better grasp the intended object. Thus, in prospective
control the infant is thought to show the ability to plan one movement, the reach for an object
Prospective control will be discussed in more depth in section A.
At the other end of this continuum of the complexity of cognitive processes is
intentional means-end behavior, in which the infant must plan a sequence of two or more
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movements. This level of intentional behavior requires the infant to perform the complicated
task of executing a movement not directed toward the desired object in order to eventually
reach the desired object (Piaget, 1954, 1963). For example, in the classic hidden object task
(Piaget, 1954, 1963), in order to retrieve an object hidden by a cloth barrier, the infant must
first remove the cloth barrier that is concealing the object and then reach for the object itself.
Thus, the mfant must complete a sequence of movements to achieve the final goal of obtaming
the toy. In successfully executmg these movements by focussmg on and retrieving the goal
toy, infants are said to possess mtentional means-end behavior. Section C will discuss
intentional means-end behavior in further detail.
The current study takes a middle approach toward examining intention. Our approach
toward intention requires more cognitive complexity than prospective control and a little less
cognitive complexity than intentional means-end behavior. We are interested in examining
the intentionality needed for when an infant reaches for an object and performs some action
with it. While this type of intentionality, which we will be referring to as movement intent
(Marteniuk, MacKenzie, Jeannerod, Athenes, and Dugas, 1987), has been studied in adult
reaching behavior, (Johnson et al., submitted; Marteniuk et al., 1987) it has not been studied in
infants. Movement intent, as defined by Marteniuk et al. (1987), involves two movements, a
reach for an object and then an action performed with that object. For example, the infant
might reach for a block and then drop it onto the floor. We, like Marteniuk et al. (1987), are
defining movement intent to involve two movements such that what an infant plans on doing
with an object (for example, dropping it onto the floor) affects how the infant reaches for the
object. This definition assumes that during the infant's movement toward the object, he/she is
planning ahead to what he/she is going to do with the object once he/she picks it up.
However, this definition of intention does not specify whether planning occurs before the
movement toward the object starts or during the movement toward the object. Instead, this
definition claims that before the infant actually picks up the object, he/she has a plan or goal
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ol-what to do wkh that object after ,t is picked up. Thus, this type of ,ntent requires more
cognitive complexity than prospective control ,n wh.ch an mlant anticipates an encounter w,lh
a desired object. Also, this mtent requires less cognitive complexity than means-end behavior
in which an infant must manipulate one object in order to reach another.
For the current study, wc wanted to establish a unique methodology to study
intentionality in general. Our unique methodology was to use the kinematics of the infants'
reach to exemplify the infants' intent. Specifically, we hypothesized that what the infant plans
on doing with an object after he/she picks it up (so, the type ol" action) will affect the
kinematics of the reach towards the object. In using kinematics in order to measure
intentionality in infants we hoped to avoid some of the past problems of using certain
observational measures to measure intentionality. For example, intentionality is frequently
measured using success/failure criteria (Frye, 1990) and causal relationships (Vedeler, 19S7,
1991) in order to determine whether or not the infant is acting intentionally. However, these
criteria have several problems which will be discussed further in sections B, I), and F.
Thus, in the current study we chose to focus on movement intent as this has not been
previously examined in infants. We speculated that movement intent is reflected in infants'
reaching behavior, i'hus, we predicted that kinematics can be used as a unique way to assess
infants' intentionality in reaching behavior, in the context of three behaviors that differed in
speed precision, and apparent intent.
Following is a more detailed discussion of movement intent, prospective behavior and
intentional means-ends behavior. After a more comprehensive discussion on how to define
intent, different ways of measuring intentional behavior will be discussed in order to
demonstrate the cons of using observational measures. I'inaliy, the kinematics of reaching
will be introduced as an alternative way to measure intentional behavior in infants.
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A. Defining Intention in Terms of Von Hnf.ten'. Prncp^.tr^^rv^
One way to define intentional behavior is in teniis of prospective control (von
Hofsten, 1993). The prospective control view of intentional behavior explains how an infant
anticipates an encounter with a desired object. Von Hofsten (1993) provided a good summary
of prospective control as a necessary skill. Von Hofsten argued that an organism's encounters
with the environment need to be prepared for and controlled for in advance. He referred to
this property of human action control as prospective behavior. He argued that the
development of action is a matter of acquiring this prospective control.
Von Hofsten argued that prospective action is a developmentally learned ability. Von
Hofsten claim.ed that what Piaget (1963) referred to as circular reactions can be seen as the
mapping of intent. When infants perform repetitive movements with slight alterations, they are
exploring their own action systems. By this process of exploring their action space, infants
learn to foresee and control actions with objects and events in the outside world. Von Hofsten
referred to motor learning as getting to know the task space and to the development of
coordinating perceptual information with actions.
There are numerous problems with coordinating action involving muscle contractions,
such as maintaining balance and equilibrium of the body with a stable orientation relative to
the environment, and the coordination of movements with the external world. We need to
adjust the timing of our actions to our surroundings. An adult running across rough terrain
exemplifies this need for adjustment. The runner's gaze must be focussed ahead of herself,
unconsciously scoping out the upcoming terrain so that when she reaches that spot ahead of
her where there is a hole in the ground, she will be prepared to jump over it. The runner's
continuous movement forward is thus achieved by knowing about the terrain ahead before she
actually reaches it. Accordingly, there is a lag time between the visual input (seeing the hole in
the ground) and the adjustment that is made (changing her stride in order to jump over the hole
when she reaches it), (see Warren, 1998 for a review of this research) However, in the above
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example, it ,s important to remember that the runner is not necessarily consciously aware of
making these adjustments. The term "knowing" is meant to be used loosely. In this example,
the runner seems to have an implicit knowledge of the upcoming surrounds Irom visual input.
Consider Anscombe's (1957) definition of intentional actions. In describing
intentional actions, Anscombe claimed that "the description of what one is doing, which one
completely understands, is at a distance from the details of one's own movements, which one
does not consider at all"(p.54). In other words, the runner in the above example knows that
she is jumping over the hole m order to avoid hurting herself, but she is not consciously aware
of the kinematics of the movement which allowed her to jump over the hole at the correct
time. She also may not have been explicitly aware of the hole ahead of time. Thus, this type
of prospective behavior translates into an implicit knowledge of the environment and how to
react in it. This view is similar to von Hoftsen's (1993) view. Prospective behavior
coordinates perception with actions that anticipate an encounter with something in the
environment.
Thus, von Hofsten (1993) described prospective behavior as a type of implicit
behavior requiring the infant to be future-oriented when interacting with the world. Future-
oriented refers to the need for the infant to prepare for and control encounters with the
environment.
B. Measuring Prospective Control Using Earlv Reaching Behavior
One way to measure intention as it is defined by prospective control, is to use early
reaching behavior. Von Hofsten (1993) suggested that one important aspect of sensorimotor
development is the acquisition of prospective control over movements in order to make them
more continuous and smooth. One such movement is reaching. Planned movements are
smooth and continuous, whereas unplanned movements are choppy and discontinuous. Von
Hofsten (1 99 1) showed early reaching movements at I9-weeks to be discontinuous and
composed of smaller movements called movement units. However, by 3 1 -weeks these
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movement units started to become smoother and resemble those of adults' reaching
trajectories. Thus, the movements by 31
-weeks were two-phased movements. They consisted
of a huge movement outwards towards the obj ect followed by a more precise movement
towards the object. Furthermore, the hand begins to decelerate before contact with the object
(Clifton, Rochat, Robin, & Berthier, 1994).
In the last two decades, a few researchers (e.g., Lockman, Ashmead, 8i Bushnell,
1984; von Hofsten & Fazel-Zandy, 1984; von Hofsten & Ronnqvist, 1988; Thelen et. al.,
1993) have turned toward examining the kinematics of early reaching in relation to
prospective behaviors. For instance, Lockman, Ashmead, and Bushnell, (1984) and von
Hofsten and Fazel-Zandy (1984) showed that young infants oriented their hand as a
preparatory gesture early in the reach towards the object. When a rod was presented vertically
or horizontally, the infant began to orient their hand in the appropriate direction before their
hand reached the rod. These adaptations occur even when oriented rods are presented in the
dark and infants cannot see their hands or the rod at the moment of contact (McCarty, Clifton,
Ashmead, Lee, and Goubet, 2001). These results suggest that infants possess some
anticipatory control over their reaches and thus are exhibiting prospective behavior.
Additional research has shown that grasping of the object is prepared before the object
is touched. Von Hofsten and Ronnqvist (1988) examined how the size of an object affects the
opening of the hand and the timing of the grasp in early reaching, in order to determine if
grasping is initiated during the approach (prospective) as opposed to after the object is touched
(reflexive). They claimed that a grasp must be adequately timed relative to the encounter with
the object and that planning must occur in order for this to take place. They first established
an adult criterion by using a motion analysis system to measure differences in apertures
(distance between thumb and index finger) during reach movements for different sized
spheres. The adults opened their hand more fully during the reach when reaching for a larger
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object, while the hand started to close at around 19% of the movement. The hand closed
earlier for a small target than for a large target.
After establishmg that these preparatory actions were observable in adults, the authors
tested whether infants also show preparatory actions when for grasping differently sized
objects. The question was whether infants start to close their hands in anticipation of the
encounter or in response to contact, and if aperture would reflect size of object to be grasped.
Using 6-, 9-, and 13-month olds, they measured the time of contact with the target (blocks
graded in size) and the time when the distance between the thumb and index finger (aperture)
decreased. These measures reflected different sorts of anticipation. The distance between the
hand and the target at the time the hand began to close reflected anticipation of grasping an
object. Size of aperture reflected anticipation of size of an object, a much more sophisticated
skill. As seen in the adult subjects, the grasps of mfants in all three age groups anticipated
contact with the object before actual contact. For the more sophisticated aperture measure, the
13- and 9-month olds prepared their grasps sooner than the 6-month olds and were more able
to anticipate the size of an object such that the aperture before the object was touched was
significantly larger for the largest object than for the smallest. The 6-month olds do not adjust
the opening of their hand to object size. Although 6-month olds do not make fine aperture
adjustments to size of object, they do vary their grips by choosing to grasp larger objects with
two hands and smaller objects with one hand (Clifton, Rochat, Litovsky, & Perris, 1991).
To summarize, prospective control is a type of intent where infants anticipate
encounters with objects. Looking at the kinematics of early reaching behavior has allowed
researchers to better quantify prospective behavior.
C. Defining hitention in Terms of Intentional Means-end Behavior
One of the other types of intention mentioned earlier in the introduction was
intentional means-end behavior. Intentional means-end behavior differs from prospective
control in that the infant must plan a sequence of two or more movements which involves the
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complicated task of directing a movement toward a different object in order to eventually
reach the desired object. The now classic Piagetian example of measuring intent (the hidden
object task) is to cover a toy with a cloth or barrier and observe whether the infant will remove
the barrier in order to retrieve the toy. Piaget (1954; 1963) defined intentional behavior by
how infants interacted with the objects involved in this task. If the infant manipulated the
intermediary object (the barrier) without playing with it, maintained attention to the goal
object (the toy), and quickly retrieved it, then the act was intentional. Thus, Piaget defined
intention in terms of a future-oriented, goal-directed action that could be demonstrated through
successful means-end behavior.
Similarly, Willatts (1999) defined intentional behavior as a behavior in which the
movement in a sequence of movements is carried out so that a final goal can be accomplished.
In his view, intentional behavior required the ability to complete a means-end task. Willatts
stated that "means-ends behavior involves the deliberate and planful execution of a sequence
of steps to achieve a goal and occurs in situations where an obstacle preventing achievement
of the goal must initially be removed"(651). Thus, Willatts described intentional behavior as a
deliberate and planful sequence of actions in order to achieve a goal. This view of intention
assumes that the infant is able to plan a sequence of events or to represent a sequence of
events before performing them.
Concurrent with the other definitions, Frye used terms relating to planning, goals, and
future-oriented actions for a sequence of events. Frye ( 1 990) also defined an act as being
intenfional if it is composed of a goal and a means or an attempt to achieve that goal. He also
referred to the infant as having expectations. Thus, intentions can be seen in specific
expectations for the outcome of certain actions.
D. Measuring Intentional Means-end Behavior Using Observational Measures
Studying intentionality through reaching behavior in general has proven to be a
difficult endeavor. As Frye ( 1 990) pointed out, whereas self-report can be a measure for
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assessing behavioral intention m adults, this method will not work with infants who are
incapable of self-report. In an attempt to measure intent in mfants, some early reaching tasks
have used observational measures to determme whether or not mfants are reaching
intentionally toward an object (Bower, Broughton, Moore, 1970; Field, 1977; Rader & Stem,
1982). These studies provide contradictory results.
For instance, a classic study by Bower, Broughton, Moore (1970) argued that early
reaching is a sign of intention in infants. They presented neonates with virtual objects (2-D)
and with solid objects (3-D). They hypothesized that if an infant reaches toward a virtual
object and nothing is there, they will become frustrated. This frustration would indicate that
the reach toward the object was intentional. Frustration was measured by the length of crying
time. They found that the neonates not only cried more when reaching toward the virtual
objects as opposed to the solid objects, but also that they reached less frequently toward the
virtual objects than toward the solid objects. Accordingly, they concluded that early reaching
behavior is an intentional behavior.
Other research using early reaching (Field, 1977; Rader & Stem, 1982) failed to
replicate Bower, Broughton, and Moore (1970). Field (1977) found that young infants did not
show surprise or frustration in the virtual object condition, that the young infant's reaching
behavior was no different in the virtual object condition than in the solid object condition.
Likewise, Rader and Stem (1982) also found that reaching behavior was elicited as readily by
the virtual objects as by the solid objects.
Another way to measure intention in infants using reaching tasks has made use of
tasks with a definite end-state (traditional hidden object means-end tasks) (e.g., Piaget, 1954,
1963; Willatts, 1984, 1985; Frye, 1980). For example, Piaget (1954; 1963) assessed
intentional behavior in means-end tasks using success and failure measures in addition to
happiness/frustration measures. Piaget relied on observational data to decide whether or not
the means-end act was intentional. If the infant manipulated the intermediary object without
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playing with ,t, maintained attention to the goal object and quickly retrieved it, then the act
was intentional. Non-search means-ends tasks such as using supports to retrieve distant
objects (Willatts, 1984; 1985) have also been used to measure intentional behavior. The
traditional support task consists of a toy placed on a towel/cloth out of reach of the infant, li-
the infant pulls on the towel in order to achieve the toy, the act is said to be intentional.
Willatts had a set of observable criteria to measure the level of intentional behavior in these
tasks similar to those used by Piaget. If the infant manipulated the intermediary object without
playing with it, maintained attention to the goal object and quickly retrieved it, then the act
was intentional.
Another way of looking at means-end behavior is to have a condition in which the
infant is presented a means-end task but the toy is not present (Willatts, 1999; McCall &
Clifton, 1999). Willatts (1999) claimed that there is a transitional period between 6- to 8-
months when the child is able to solve the non-search means-end task but may not be doing so
intentionally. Thus, non-intentional behavior transforms into intentional behavior sometime
between 6- to 8-months. He proposed that it is more important to look at the method that the
infants used to solve the problem instead of looking at whether or not they could solve the
problem. Willatts (1999) had two conditions, one in which a toy was present on the cloth and
one in which the toy was not present. The 6-month olds behaved about the same whether or
not a toy was present. He interpreted this behavior to be transitional instead of intentional,
where transitional behavior was defined as having partial intention. Intentional behavior was
scored in terms of cloth behavior, fixation on toy, and toy behavior. The 6-month olds
appeared to be more directed toward retrieving the cloth rather than the toy. In contrast, the 7-
and 8-month olds exhibited more intentional behavior when a toy was present as to compared
to no toy. Thus, they removed the cloth without playing with it, they fixated on the toy, and
quickly retrieved it.
10
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Frye (1990) performed another variant of the means-ends task to try to better
intentional behavior. Frye (1990) defined an act as being intentional
.f ,t ,s composed of a
goal and a means or an attempt to achieve that goal. Thus, having intentions means having
specific expectations for the outcome of certain actions. Frye suggested studying
intentionality in infants without using success and failure measures. Instead, he proposed that
we manipulate the outcomes and mismatch the means and goals in the classic means-ends
tasks in order to measure mtention. For instance, in Frye's version of the support task, the
cloth was equipped with a hidden pulley system so that the experimenter changed the effect
that pulling the cloth had on the toy. The infant was presented with a toy placed on a cloth
and allowed to retrieve it three times in a row, as in the normal support task. Then, on the
fourth trial, the unexpected event happened. When the infant pulled the cloth towards
him/herself, the toy moved away from the infant instead of toward. In a similar condition, the
infant was allowed three normal trials followed by an unexpected trial in when the infant
pulled the cloth, the toy did not move. There was also a mismatch condition, in which the
cloth was removed and the infant was presented a string attached to the toy. If the infant
pushed the string toward the toy, then the toy came into reach. Thus, in this last condition, the
means and goals were mismatched such that an action such as pushing the string resulted in an
unexpected outcome.
Frye observed the infant's level of surprise when an unexpected goal was achieved or
when an expected goal was not achieved for 8-, 16-, and 24-month olds. He argued that if an
unexpected result occurred or something unexpected happened as the result of a particular
action, then the intentional infant should show surprise. The infant's surprise was judged by
facial expressions rated by blind observers using a 3-point scale. Mild puzzlement was
defined as pausing, slight frowning or sober expression and surprise was defined as widening
of the eyes, raised eyebrows, pointing, or exclaiming. Frye argued that surprise demonstrated
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that the infant knew that a certain means should not result in a certain outcome and thus had
been acting intentionally.
Frye concluded that based on ratings of the mfant's surprise that he could claim that
the older infants (16- and 24-month) were exhibitmg surprise in all of the conditions and thus
were behaving intentionally. However, Frye could not conclusively conclude whether or not
the 8-month olds were actmg intentionally usmg this surprise measure. He claimed that there
was partial evidence for intentional behavior m 8-month olds. The 8-month olds showed
surprise in the unexpected outcomes conditions, but not were not surprised by the mismatch
condition. However, Frye did not provide a clear explanation as to why this might have
occurred, other than conjecturing that 8-month olds did not seem to have expectations for the
outcome of actions.
E. Problems with Using Means-end Behavior as a Wav of Measuring htention
While the studies discussed above tried to measure intentional behavior by looking at
reaching behavior (either reaching for an object or completing a means-end task), there are
problems with their measures. The reaching for object studies provide contradictory results
which could be due to using observational measures. Likewise, using means-ends behavior as
a way to measure intention in infants has proved problematic for a number of reasons. One
problem is the danger of assuming that a successfully completed task has been done so
intentionally (Frye, 1990; Vedeler, 1987, 1991). In the hidden object task, it is unclear
whether the infant was performing one action (removing the barrier) with the intention of
performing another action (picking up the toy) or whether the infant picked up the barrier
because it was interesting in its own right and then picked up the toy because it "appeared."
Consequently, using a "success test" to measure intentionality is problematic because the
completed act could have been accomplished by accident or by lucky chances.
Likewise, there is a danger in assuming that failure to complete a task is a mark of
unintentionality (Frye, 1990). While an individual may intend for something to happen.
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he/she may faU to choose the correct means m which to make ,t happen. Even though the
individual failed, it does not mean that they did not intend to complete the task. Therefore,
using success or failure guidehnes to measure intentionaUty such as used by P.aget (1954) and
Willatts ( 1 984; 1 985) can be problematic.
Another problem exists with using observational measures such as surprise to measure
intention. For example, one possible problem with Frye's (1990) observational measure of
surprise is his assumption that all ages are equally good at expressing these emotional levels.
It could be that older infants are much better at expressing suiprise than younger infants.
Accordingly, the younger infants could have still been surprised, but were simply not as adept
at displaying their surprise. Thus, this is another instance where relying solely on
observational measures can lead to interpretation problems.
Another problem that exists with using observational measures is causal relationships.
As we have seen it thus far, intentionality is referred to in terms of goal-directedness in which
infants are tested using means-ends tasks. These tasks require an infant to have a goal in
mind; a future-oriented, mental representation of a state of affairs which is yet to be realized.
Vedeler (1987, 1991) argued that this common definition of intention in terms of goal-
directedness is difficult to measure simply through observations. Although a certain end state
has been achieved in these means-ends tasks, Vedeler pointed out that it is dirficull to know
simply from observation, whether or not the end state achieved was done so intentionally and
whether the preceding behaviors were actual means to achieving that end state. Vedeler also
suggested that the goal directedness definition of intentionality implicitly assumes prior
intentions (doing one action in order to achieve some goal) and are thus difficult to validate.
Vedeler referred to causal relationships in order to make his point. Causal relationships are
those events which can be perceived to look intentional even when they arc not. I^'or example,
you can observe causal relationships, like a foot hitting a ball. You see the foot move and see
a ball roll, but you cannot attribute intentionality to this act with any certainty. The foot could
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have just stumbled onto the ball. Accordingly, Vedeler made the important pomt that a
"description of causal relationships between behavior and environmental events thus would
not suffice to account for the cues used when attributing an intention" (p. 7, 1987).
In order to alleviate this problem, Vedeler suggested that we focus on the infant's
behavior as it is directed toward objects and assess this behavior using the infant's behavioral
dynamics. Vedeler posited that there should be somethmg in the way that the behavior is
deployed, m the way the event is brought about that distinguishes an intentional action from
unintentional behavior and that this somethmg might be the kinematics of the behavior.
Vedeler suggested that "if behavioral dynamics can be specified by kinematics, the behavioral
feature we are looking for might very well be described m terms of kinematic patterns "(p.l5,
1987). Whereas Vedeler suggested that kinematics should be used to measure intent, he
remained vague about specifying the kinematic pattern and presented no data.
The idea remains that the kinematics of the behavior could be more revealing than
describing or measuring the final outcome of the behavior. Accordingly, using the kinematic
patterns would get around this problem of causal relationships and provide a more objective
and quantifiable means to assess intentionality.
F. DefininR Intention in Terms of Movement Intent
While both prospective control, e.g. anticipating encounters with the environment
(vonHofsten, 1993) and means-end behavior, e.g. planning a sequence of steps in order to
achieve a goal (Piaget, 1954, 1963; Willatts, 1999; Frye, 1990) are valid ways of defining
intentional behavior, the current study approaches intentional behavior in a slightly different
way. There are a couple of reasons for this different approach. First of all, while intentional
behavior can have elements of prospective control, it is more difficult to claim that prospective
behavior is intentional. In other words, on the basis of prospective behavior it is difficult to
claim that the infant is consciously planning a behavior in advance, has a goal or some sort of
representation of the future in mind. Prospective behavior anticipates an encounter with the
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environment by forming a link between perception and action. Prospective behavior is future-
oriented behavior, but it is behavior that could occur without a definite plan in mind. The
mfant has the visual mformation m front of him/her, and could just be reacting to the visual
stimulus. The aspect of intention that we wish to address relates to having some sort of
representation of some future state of events that is not available from immediate visual
perception of the object.
Secondly, as already discussed, the means-end tasks used to measure intention rely
heavily on observational measures such as surprise, success/failure, and causal relationships
by which to infer intentionality. These tasks require adult observers to infer the mental state
of infants by relying solely on observational measures. We want to find an alternative way to
measure intention that does not depend solely on subjective observational measures. We wish,
instead, to be able to develop a better way of quantifying intentional behavior in infants.
Therefore, Vedeler's (1987, 1991) fmdmgs combmed with the success of using kinematic
measures of prospective behavior (e.g., von Hofsten and Ronnqvist, 1988) and the adult
studies that will be discussed in the next couple of pages, have lead us to believe that the
kinematics of reaching would be an excellent measure of intent.
Our approach toward defining intention involves two movements such that what an
infant intends to do with an object (for example dropping it onto the floor) affects how the
infant picks the object up. In other words, during the infant's movement toward an object,
he/she is planning ahead to what he/she is going to do with the object once they pick it up,
thus exhibiting intentional behavior. Marteniuk, MacKenzie, Jeannerod, Athenes, and Dugas
(1987) referred to this type of intention as movement intent. This definition of intention does
not specify whether planning occurs before the movement toward the object starts or during
the movement toward the object. Instead, this definition claims that before the infant actually
picks up the object, he/she has a plan or an intention toward what to do with that object after it
is picked up.
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This definition of intention comes in part from the British philosopher, Anscombe
(1957) who claimed that "in order to make sense of 'I do P with a view to do Q\ we must see
how the future state of affairs, Q, is supposed to be a possible later stage in proceedings of
which the action, P, is an earlier stage"(p.36). Anscombe claimed that concern with a future
state of affairs is an expression of mtention. However, this definition must be qualified such
that the agent must purposefully and directly bring about the future state of affairs. Therefore,
an intentional act is a purposeful attempt to bring about a future state. Reaching for objects
satisfies Anscombe's criteria of an intenfional act. For example, in reaching for an object, the
future state of affairs is grasping the object and then doing something with it (most often
bringing it to the mouth in the case of early reaching infants). This future state of affairs is
achieved by the infant actually reaching directly in space to the spatial location of the object
before proceeding to the second action. This is similar to intenfional means-ends behavior in
that it requires two stages; however, the sequencing of events is more simple and only
involves one object.
In addition, we are thinking of an intenfional act in terms of a skilled, goal-directed
acfion, such as reaching, grasping, or dropping. Take for example the intentional act of an
infant dropping a toy onto the ground, hi order to drop the toy onto the ground, the infant
must first reach out for the toy, grasp the toy, and bring the toy to a location above the ground
before releasing it. This definifion of intenfion in part comes from Bruner (1970; 1973) who
claimed that skilled behavior by its very nature is intentional. A skilled acfivity has an
objecfive to be achieved. He defined skill as being a smoothly flowing action that results from
anticipating what is coming next; the actor has a sense of the current, ongoing action and of
what comes next. He defined skilled behaviors in the first year as those that allow the infant
to manipulate the world, such as reaching and grasping. Bruner's philosophy was that the
hands "both shape and express human instrumental intelligence" (p.247). Bruner proposed
that early skilled motor behavior provides insight into human problem solving and thought.
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The approach of the current study was to assess intent at a much more basic level than
has been seen m the means-ends tasks and at a more complex level than the early reaching
tasks discussed above. We are defining mtentionality as a special category of goal-directed
behavior involving elements of motor preparation to make something happen. That ,s, an
action is undertaken with a subsequent goal in mmd, rather than manipulating more than one
object, as in the means-ends tasks. We expect to see that infants are acting with intent and that
this is reflected into the kinematics of the reaching movements.
G. Using Kinematics to Measure Movement Intent m Adults
Using kinematics to measure movement intent has already been successfully used in
adults. This approach has demonstrated that it is possible to use kinematic analyses of
reaching speeds in order to measure intent, such that intent is reflected in the motor control of
the reaching behavior. For example, Runeson and Frykholm (1981; 1983) demonstrated that
visible, body movements can provide insight into the intent of the mover. Runeson and
Frykholm (1981) had adult subjects observe videotaped adults lifting varying weights of
boxes. Only the lifter's joints were visible as patches of light against a dark background. The
observers were then asked to judge the weights of the boxes. Runeson and Frykholm found
that by viewing the lifter's joints, the observers were able to judge the weight of the boxes
with a good degree of accuracy. Similarly, Runeson and Frykliolm (1983) found that even
when only viewing the lead-in or approach movements of someone lifting a box, an observer
can accurately determine whether the box will be heavy or light. They even found that when a
lifter tried to fake whether or not they were reaching for a heavy or a light box that these
deceptive movements did not obliterate the kinematic information about the true properties of
a person's action. The authors hypothesized that the perceptible kinematics such as seen in
postural preadjustments before the lifting act, cue observers into the intent of the lifter; i.e.
whether they are preparing to lift up a heavy box or a light box.
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These studies support the idea that kinematics (people's movements) provide useful
insight into the hidden properties of behavior, such as intent. In many cases, kinematic
changes in relation to intentionality are not easy to perceive, and require the use of motion
analysis systems. For instance, Marteniuk et al. (1987) claimed that the intent of what one
wishes to do with an object affects the movement planning and control processes of the inUuil
reach for that object, and can be measured in the kinematics of the reaching behavior.
Marteniuk et al. (1987) referred to this type of intention as movement intent. In other words,
what one is eventually going to do with an object once it is picked up affects the kinematics of
the initial reaching movement towards the object. In Marteniuk et al., university students
reached for a disk placed on a table in front of them, 30 cm away. Before trial onset, subjects
were instructed to reach for the disk quickly and either throw the disk into a box 15cm away
(throwing condition) or to fit the disk into a container with a diameter only slightly larger than
the disk itself located 10-cm away (fitting condition). The order of the two conditions were
counterbalanced and the conditions were blocked, so that for each condition, there were five
practice trials and five experimental trials.
The kinematics of the reaches were recorded using WATSMART (a motion analysis
system based on infrared emitting diodes), with four IREDS attached to the participant's right
arm. Movement time for the initial reach (defined as starting with the first detectable
movement toward the disk and ending with contact with the disk), peak speed (the highest
point on the speed curve), and time to peak speed (providing the accelerative and decelerative
phases of the movement) were calculated. The peak speed was higher in the throwing
condition than in the fitting condition. In addition, movement time toward the object was
longer in the fitting condition than in the throwing condition. This difference took place
during the deceleration portion of the reach (amount of time from peak speed to contact) such
that the deceleration phase was longer in the fitting condition than in the throwing condition.
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Importantly, the first portion of the two tasks was identical (i.e., reaching oul and
picking up the disk). Therefore, there is nothing in the demands of the reach toward the object
that should cause a difference m reaching speeds. Perceptually, the focus of the initial reach
to pick up the disk was identical in both conditions. Thus, it was the goal of the task (either
fitting or throwing) which affected the kinematics of the reach to the object. The authors
suggested that one possible reason for the lengthening of the deceleration portion in the fitting
condition was the task's requirement for precision. Hence, as the precision requirements of
the task increased, the greater portion of the reach was spent in the deceleration phase. Thus,
the precision demands of the task to be accomplished after the object was picked up affected
the kinematics of the approach to the object.
While Marteniuk argued that it was the precision demands of the task that lead to the
changes in movement time duration and time spent in deceleration, more recently, Johnson,
McCarty, and Clifton (submitted) found instead that the anticipation of a second movement
(M2) which required transporting an object to a new location affected the kinematics of the
initial reach to the object (Ml). Johnson et al. described this influence on the kinematics of
the reach as occurring because of context effects. Similar to Marteniuk's movement intent,
context effects refer to the idea that in a sequence of reaching movements the first movement
is affected by the second movement, because the first movement is influenced by the context
of the entire sequence. Thus, Johnson et al. argued that the individual movements that
comprise a sequence of movements do not occur in isolation. In other words, they claimed
that motor behaviors, in this case reaching specifically, are sensitive to the context in which
they occur. In this case, the important context is whether or not an object will be transported
to a new location and how this affects the initial reach differently.
Johnson et al. did a series of experiments looking at this phenomenon of how the
goals of upcoming actions with an object, affect the kinematics of the initial reach toward the
object. In experiment 1 there were two conditions; a grasp and lift condition and a grasp and
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place condition. In the grasp and lift condition, adult subjects reached for, grasped and lifted a
cube vertically above its original location. In the grasp and place condition, adult subjects
reach for, grasped and transported a cube to a new location before placing the cube through an
opening in a tabletop. Johnson et al. found that the duration of Ml was longer in the grasp
and lift condition than in the grasp and place condition. While the other kinematic measures,
such as peak velocity and average velocity were not significantly different, the percentage of
Ml where the peak velocity occurred was significantly different between the two conditions.
Thus, less time was spent decelerating when participants intended to transport the cube to a
new location (the grasp and place condition), than when the participants lifted and held the
cube at the same location. If the kinematics of the reach were dependent on the physical
attributes of the conditions (in both cases participants reached the identical distance for the
identical cube) then the kinematics of the reaches should be identical. However, since the
kinematics of Ml were not identical, these results suggest that the differences occuired
because of what the adult was going to do with the cube once it was picked up; transport it to a
new location or not.
In experiment 2, Johnson et al. examined the effects of task precision demands on the
kinematics of the initial reach by having a grasp and place "easy" condition (in which the
opening was 3.5cnr larger than the cube) and a grasp and place "difficult" condition (in which
the opening was 0.5cm' larger than the cube). They found that task precision demands had no
effect on Mi's duration time or on the kinematic measures for the two conditions. Thus,
unlike Marteniuk et al., who argued that the differing kinematics were due to the precision
demands of the task, Johnson et al. argued that the differences they found were due to whether
or not an object was transported to a new location.
Johnson et al. theorized that the duration and decelerative portion of Ml were shorter
in the transportation condition because the goal of the task was highly specific (transport
object to a specific new location) which led to less time spent in deceleration and consequently
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to a shorter duration. Conversely, in the non-transportation condition, the goal of the task was
less specific and therefore the movements are more difficult to plan in advance. They
suggested that this mimmizmg of goal specificity is what leads to more time spent
decelerating and consequently to a longer duration. More broadly, they argued that context
effects influence the kinematics of reaching.
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CHAPTER 2
STUDY DESIGN
We propose to use the kinematic methodology to see if these context cITects occur ,n
the motor behavior of mfants as well. That is, does what the infants intend to do wUh Ihc
object after they pick it up (movement intent) innuence the kinematics of their initial reach lor
the object? Just as Marteniuk et al. (1987) and Johnson et al. (submitted) were able to show
that movement intent/ context effects are reflected in the motor behavior of adults, we hope to
show that the same is true in the motor behavior of infants. To accomplish this, wc modeled
our procedures after Marteniuk et al. (1987) and Johnson et al. (submitted), using 10.5 month
olds as our subjects and a 4.5cm diameter ball as our object.
We had three conditions: a holding condition, a throwing condition, and a fitting
condition. The hold condition allowed the infant to reach for the ball and explore it. This
condition allowed us to measure the kinematics of the approach phase when there was no
particular or consistent planned second movement that followed the first movcmcnl. The two
conditions succeeding the hold condition (the throwing condition and the fitting condition)
were counterbalanced across subjects. We were unable to counterbalance all three conditions,
because once we demonstrated a specific planned second movement for the ball (i.e. throwing
or fitting) we felt that infants might not be satisfied just picking up the ball. When infants did
simply grasp and hold the ball in later trials, these were counted as "hold" trials.
In the throwing condition, the experimenter first demonstrated throwing or dropping
the ball onto the lloor or into a plastic tub several times. The ball was then presented to the
infant and the experimenter encouraged the infant to reach for the ball and throw or drop it oii
the lloor. Dropping and throwing behavior starts occurring around 9 to 10 months (Bayley,
1969). For example, the infant might be sitting in a highchair with a toy in hand and drop or
throw it onto the lloor. Once the toy has been retrieved by the parent and handed back, the
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infant will drop it agam. Th.s dropping behavior appears to be an intentional act because it is
repeated over and over. Thus, we thought that this dropping behavior would be an activity
that the infants had some familiarity with and would be eager and interested ,n participating.
In the fitting condition, the experimenter demonstrated fitting tlic ball into the opening
of an opaque cylinder where it rolled through and came out the other end. The action was
repeated by the experimenter several times, and then the infant was presented with the ball and
encouraged to reach for the ball in order to repeal this fitting action. This task is based on a
Gesell and Amatruda scales item (1974) in which the infant must pick up a cube and release it
into a cup. In our version of the task, a cylinder was presented to the infant, and he/she was
encouraged to place a ball in the mouth of the cylinder, so that it would fall through and come
out the other end. We used a cylinder instead of a cup, so that unlike the cup, the infant would
not be able to put his/her hand down the cylinder and reclaim the ball. In addition, Ihc mouth
of the cylinder was only wide enough for the ball to go through. To be succcsslul, the infant
had to release the ball at the cylinder's mouth.
In order to have an adult measure by which to base the kinematics of these reaching
behaviors, we also ran 10 adult subjects in a modified version of the above procedures. The
adults performed 3 different actions (fitting, throwing, and holding) with three differently
sized objects (a disk, a small ball, and a large ball), resulting in a total of 9 conditions, whose
order were counterbalanced across participants. There were a couple of reasons why we
choose to use 3 different sized objects for the adults. First of all, we wanted to have an object
condition which would replicate Marteniuk et al.(1987). Thus, one of our objects was a disk
that was the same size as used in Marteniuk et al. Secondly, wc wanted to have an object
condition that would be the same as the object we would use in our infant study. Thus, the
small ball was the same size as that used in the infant version of this study. Lastly, we wanted
to see if hand to object size ratio would make a difference in the kinematics for these three
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aofons. S.ncc the small ball lulled the hand ofthe infant, we used a large ball for our llurd
object that filled the hand ofthe adult subjects.
The fitting and throwing procedures were similar to those of Marteniuk et al.( 1987), in
which the adult started at a designated position on a table, reached forward, grasped the object
and then placed it through a hole in the table to the left ofthe original location of ihe object, or
grasped the object and then threw it into a bucket placed on the lloor lo the left of ihe original
location ofthe object. The holding condition procedures were similar to those of .U,hnson el
al. (submitted), in which the adult started at a designated position on a table, reached forward,
grasped the object and then picked it straight up into the air, holding it for a couple of seconds.
In order to make our adult reaching more comparable to infant reaching, we asked participants
to reach at a natural and comfortable reaching speed. This instruction was unlike those given
by Marteniuk et al. and Johnson et al., who instructed their participants to reach al a rapid
speed.
The three action conditions (fitting, throwing, and holding) allowed us to use both Ihc
Marteniuk et al.'s findings and Johnson el al.'s findings with adults and compare the
kinematics ofthe movements across ages. As in Marteniuk et al. (1987), we had a throwing/
dropping condition and a fitting condition to allow us to look at whether precision demands
affected reaching kinematics in infants, ihe releasing portion ofthe throwing task did not
require much precision, whereas the releasing portion ofthe fitting task did. Based upon
Martineuk's findings, we predicted that the intent of either throwing/dropping the ball onto the
floor or fitting it precisely in the mouth of a cylinder would cause differences in the approach
speed toward the ball as it had with adults. In addition, as in Marteniuk et al.(1987), we
expected to find a longer deceleration phase in the approach toward the ball for the lilting
condition than for the throwing condition for both the infant and adult subjects. A lengthening
of the deceleration phase of the reach toward the object when a precision movement will
follow grasping would indicate that intent is rcHccted into the motor control of reaching
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behavior ,n 10.5-mon.h old infan.s^ Thus, we would be able ,o eonclude prior imemionali.y,
such that at some pomt before the infant grasped the ball, they had already planned the.r next
movement with it.
In addition, as in Johnson et al. (submitted), we had a no-second action condition (our
hold condition) and a second action condition (our fitting or our throwing conditions), to see
whether a second action, in which an object was transported to a new location affected
reaching kinematics in infants. We expected to see a difference in speed between the single
action condition and the other two conditions in both the infants and the adults. As was found
in Johnson et. al.(submitted), we expected that when a second movement is not planned (i.e.,
the infant just picks up and holds the ball), that the approach speed would be slower than in
the other conditions which involved a planned second movement (fitting or throwing).
Thus, these results would indicate not only that 10.5-month old infants possess
behavioral intent in their interactions with external objects, but also that measuring kinematics
of reaching can provide us with a new method of measuring intent in infants of various ages.
We predicted that 10.5-month olds do possess intent in that they have the ability to plan a
sequence of actions in advance and that this movement intent can be measured using
kinematics. If, however, no kinematic differences among the three conditions occurred, we
would be unable to conclude anything about intentionality. We would encounter the same
problems presented by Frye (1990) and Vedeler (1987, 1991) regarding issues such as success
at the endpoint does not indicate intent, as well as causal relationships do not indicate intent.
We assume that kinematics are more revealing than the final outcomes of behavior. In
addition to observing the infants perform the appropriate actions, we hoped to find something
different in the kinematics of the approach that would allow us to claim thai the act was
intentional.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS
A. Participants
Thirty 10.5-month old infants participated m the study. Of these 30 infants, 5 were
excluded because of fussiness and not wanting to complete the tasks, 1 was excluded because
he/she would not wear the IREDs, and 3 were excluded because there was not enough
kinematic data on their reaches, leaving 21 infants (15 males, 6 females, mean age = 10
months, 2 weeks; range = 9 months, 1 week to 1 1 months). The names of the infants were
obtained through the Massachusetts state birth records. The parents were first contacted by an
informational letter describing the study, followed by a phone call to see if they were
interested in participating. The infant received a t-shirt with our lab's logo and a certificate at
the end of the session as compensation for participation.
In addition, 10 right-handed University of Massachusetts at Amherst graduate students
participated in an adult version of the study. One participant was excluded due to
experimenter error leaving 9 total participants (2 males; 7 females). Participation was
voluntary.
B. Materials
For the infant version of the tasks, the infant was securely seated in a booster seat or a
highchair (without the table attached) opposite the experimenter. Stimuli consisted of 4.5cm
diameter balls, a clear tube (5cm diameter) with openings on both ends, and a plastic tub
(30cm by 13cm by 2.7cm). The clear tube was used for the fitting trials and the plastic tub
was used for the throwing trials.
For the adult version of the tasks, adults were seated at a square card table. Stimuli
consisted of three different sized objects; a 4cm diameter by 1cm disk, a 4.5cm diameter bail
(small ball), and a 7cm diameter ball (large bail). For each trial, the object was placed 30cm
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medially from a designated starting point at the edge of the table. Appropriate sized holes
(4. 1cm wide hole for the disk trials, 4.6cm wide hole for the small ball trials, and 7.1cm wide
hole for the large ball trials) were placed 30cm medially and lOcm left from a designated
starting point at the edge of the table. A plastic tub (30cm by 13cm by 2.7cm) was placed
30cm medially and 1 5cm left from a designated starting point. This placed the tub on the
Hoor next to the table, (see Figure 1)
Container for
throwing
Figure 1
.
Schematic of adult study apparatus.
Kinematic measures were obtained from an Optotrak motion analysis system
(Northern Digitial). Two infrared emitting diodes (IREDs) were placed on the back of each of
the infant's hands, one on the radial and one on the ulnar side. Two IRI^Ds on each hand were
used in case one went out of sight during hand rotation. For the adult subjects 2 IREDs were
placed on only the right hand; one was positioned between the 2'"' and 3"' knuckles and one
was positioned slightly above the wrist. Three banks of three infrared cameras each, placed
above, to the right, and to the left of the participants, estimated the location of the IREDs in
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3D space throughout the trials. Data was collected at a rate of lOOHz for both the infants and
the adults, for a duration of 15 seconds and 5 seconds for each trial, respectively.
A side view of reaching behavior for both the infants and the adults was recorded
using a digital camera (Sony model#: DCR-TRV510). A red light, visible on the digital
recording indicated when the motion analysis system was recording data. This rod light
allowed us to coordinate the two data sets (behavioral and kinematic).
C. Procedure
For the infant version of the task, the infant was placed in a booster seat or highchair
with the parent sitting to the side and slightly behind the infant. Occasionally, the infant
would be placed in the parent's lap if he/she did not want to sit in the highchair. One
experimenter entertained the infant with toys while a second experimenter attached the four
IREDs with micropore tape to the back of the infant's hands. During the testing session, the
primary experimenter sat in a chair directly across from the infant.
A secondary experimenter and the equipment to run the session were positioned
behind a curtain in a corner of the room. The role of this experimenter was to watch the video
monitor and Optotrak monitor, and trigger the Optotrak to begin recording at the start of each
trial. The start of the trial occurred when the primary experimenter positioned the ball within
reach of the infant. The secondary experimenter was also responsible for making sure thai 1
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seconds elapsed before the next trial began.
There were three conditions: a hold condition, a throw condition, and a fit condition.
Each infant was given the opportunity to participate in all three conditions, with each infant
being giving the hold condition first, followed by either throwing-fitting or fitting-throwing,
which were blocked and counterbalanced across participants. In Ihc hold condition, the
experimenter held the ball at midline in Iront of the infant within an easy reaching distance.
The experimenter encouraged the infant to reach for the ball. The infant was allowed to reach
for the ball and explore it haptically for the duration of the trial. The experimenter gently took
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it away, and then after a couple of seconds presented the ball to the infant again. This
continued for 6 trials.
Next, the infant was assigned to either the throw first condition or the fit first
condition. In the throwing condition, the experimenter first demonstrated the throwing action.
In the demonstration, the experimenter held the ball, got the infant's attention, and then wuh
much gusto threw the ball onto the floor or into a plastic tub. After a few demonstrations of
the throwing action, the experimenter held the ball at midline in front of the infant and
encouraged him/her to reach for the ball and to repeat the throwing action. Demonstrations
were repeated as needed. The ball was presented at least 8 times or until the infant would no
longer reach for the ball or perform the appropriate throwing action.
In the fitting condition, the experimenter first demonstrated the fitting action. In the
demonstration, the experimenter held the ball, got the infant's attention, and with the clear
tube in one hand, released the ball into it and caught it with much delight when it emerged
from the other end. After a few demonstt-ations of the fitting action, the experimenter held the
ball at midline (within easy reaching distance) and the tube (out of reaching distance) in front
of the infant. After the infant grasped the ball, the tube was quickly moved into reach, so that
the infant could fit the ball down it. Demonstrations were repeated as needed. The ball was
presented at least 8 times or until the infant would no longer reach for the ball or perform the
appropriate fitting acfion.
A modified version of this procedure was used with the adult participants. The same
basic procedure was used as in Marteniuk et al. (1987), but with more actions and objects.
Adults performed 3 different actions (holding, fitting, throwing) using 3 different sized/
shaped objects (a disk, a small ball, and a large ball), resulting in 9 different conditions. Each
adult participated in all 9 conditions, which were counterbalanced to control for order effects.
In addition, whereas Marteniuk et al. had the adults reach as quickly as they could for the
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object, we had our adult participants reach at a natural reaching speed which we thought
would be more comparable to the infants' reaching behavior.
Each of the 9 conditions was blocked into groups of 10 trials each. Participants
performed the 3 different actions on all 3 objects, using different grips depending on the
object. For the disk tnals, participants were instructed to use a pincer gi-,p (thumb and index
finger), the grip used in the Marteniuk et al. study. For the small ball trials, participants used a
fingertip grip. For the large ball trials, participants used a palmer grasp as the infants did. For
the holding trials, participants were instructed to reach for the object (30cm in front of them),
pick it straight up mto the air and hold it for a couple of seconds. For the fitting trials,
participants were instructed to reach for the object, pick it up and fit it into a hole (10cm to the
left of the object) and then return to the starting point. For the throwing trials, participants
were instructed to reach for the object, pick it up, and throw it into a bucket placed on the floor
(15cm to left of the object) and then to return to the starting point. The fitting and holding
tasks were similar to Johnson et al. (submitted), and the fitting and throwing tasks were
similar to Marteniuk et al. (1987).
D. Data Scoring
For the infants, behavioral scoring of all of the trials was done by viewing the digital
tapes by a primary observer. In addition, half of the infants were also scored by a secondary
observer in order to ensure reliability. Each trial was scored by viewing the digital tape to
determine whether a reach had occurred and which hand was used to grasp the ball, the hand
used to perform any subsequent acfion, and what that action was. The observers also had to
determine whether the reach started before or after the Optotrak started recording. Those
reaches that were not fully recorded by the Optotrak were excluded from the kinematic
analyses. When a trial contained multiple reaches, all reaches were scored. Reach onset was
defined as the first continuous forward movement toward the ball that did not reverse or stop
and resulted in contact with the ball. Grasp time was defined as the time of contact, when the
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fingers started to curl around the ball. The start and end times were used with the Optotrak
data to demarcate beginnings and endings of kmematic data for a reach. In order for the reach
to result in a successfully completed action, the hand used to grasp the ball and the hand used
to perform the action had to be the same. Thus, if the mfant reached and grasped the ball with
the left hand and then transferred it to the right hand for fitting/throwing, this trial was
excluded.
The observers coded for 3 main infant behaviors: fittmg, throwing, and holding.
Fitting was defined as releasmg the ball down the tube, hi addition, a subcategory of fitting
was used, because the infants did not always release the ball down the tube, but simply held
the ball at the opening. This subcategory, called tube, was defined as the infant bringing the
ball to the opening of the tube but not actually releasing the ball into the tube. Throwing was
defined as releasing the ball by opening up the fingers and first moving the hand slightly
upwards and then downwards before releasing, hi addition, a subcategory of throwing was
used, dropping, because the infants did not consistently vigorously throw the ball, but often
simply released it. Thus, the term dropping was used to describe behavior in which the infant
held the ball over the floor and simply released it by opening up the fingers around the ball.
Holding was defined as holding the ball in hand for 3 to 4+ consecufive seconds. Any other
acfion, such as placing ball in mouth, were described according to a list of coding guidelines.
See Appendix A for complete coding guidelines and typical protocol sheet for scoring
videotaped behavior.
A secondary observer scored one-half of the infants in order to calculate reliability for
the reach onset fime, grasp fime, and acfion type. The two observers had 90% agreement
within 0.1 sec in judging the moment of reach onset and 92% agreement within 0.1 sec in
judging grasp fime. The two observers had 97% agreement in judging action type.
For the adults subjects, reach onset and grasp times were determined by looking at the
Optotrak data using the same procedure used in Johnson, McCarty, and Clifton (submitted).
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Reach onset was defined as the point at which hand speed first exceeded and remained greater
than 50mm/sec for a minimum of 350msec. Grasp time was determined by locating the point
of minimal hand speed withm a 700msec window. The validity of these 2 measures was
checked manually and the extreme trials were eliminated. (1.0% of the trials were
eliminated.) The reach distance also needed to be around 30cm for reaches to be included in
data analyses.
E. Kinematic Data Analysis
For the infants, the reach onset and grasp times observed via the digital tapes were
used in conjuction with the Optotrak data m order to obtain kinematic measures of the reach.
Table 1 displays the number of trials and reaches m each condition, including a breakdown of
reasons for excluded trials for the infants. Although an attempt was made to have the infants
parficipate in 6 trials of holding and 8 trials each of fitting and throwing, we also needed to be
flexible as to which tasks the infants were interested in and to the action that the infant chose
to perform with the ball. In order to be included in any analysis, each infant had to contribute
at least one Optotrak trial to 2 out of the 3 actions. As discussed in the data scoring section, for
each trial, the observer recorded what action the infant actually performed as opposed to the
acfion that the infant was "supposed" to perform, i.e., what the trial indicated. Thus, in trials
in which the infants did something different such as choosing to hold the ball instead of fitting
the ball down the tube for the fitting trial, then this trial would be considered a holding trial as
opposed to a fitting trial for the kinemafic analyses.
In Table 1 we can see the total number of trials that the infants held, fit, and threw the
ball. In some instances, the infant would not reach for the ball at all. Those instances are
listed under No Reach for Ball. In some instances, when the infant reached for the ball, he/she
switched the hand that the ball was in before actually performing an action. Since our
hypotheses are based on the idea that the reach for the object is affected by the next movement
the child will make with that object, we can tell nothing relevant to our study when the infant
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switches the ball to the other hand before performing the action. Thus, we excluded those
trials from analyses.
Table 1
Trials Analyzed and Excluded bv Condition for Twenty-one Infants
Breakdown of trials and reaches Holding M 1 ttin tT Throwing
1 otal # of Trials 238 253 204
No Reach for Ball f 40 38
Reached and Switched Hands 54 25 28
Ball to the Mouth 64 NA NA
Reaches Missing IREDs 63 89 87
Reaches eliminated for criterion of 3 32 4
1 to 6 trials for each action
Total OPTOTRAK reaches 47 67 47
analyzed for kinematic
measures
Reaches that were missing more than 33 frames (=1/3 sec) of consecutiye Optotrak
data points were excluded from these analyses (denoted as reaches missing IREDs in Table 1).
For reaches missing fewer than 33 frames of consecutive data points, a linear spline was used
to fill in the missing data points. These reaches were then included in all subsequent
measures. Missing data points in the reaches could haye resulted from the IREDs being
obscured by the highchair or the parent, or by the hand rotating the IREDs out of view of the
cameras.
Some infants particularly enjoyed a certain activity and engaged in a large number of
reaches in that condition. In order to prevent these participants from contributing an
overwhelming amount of data to a category, we used a 1 to 6 trial criterion for each infant for
each action. The use of this criterion meant that for each infant, he/she contributed 1 to 6
Optofrak trials to at least 2 out of the 3 conditions. For those infants who had more than 6
Optotrak trials that they could contribute to each condition, only the first 6 Optotrak trials for
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each condition for that infant were used in the analyses. Appendix B provides a breakdown of
what each individual mfant contributed in terms of actions performed and those trials that had
usable Optotrak data.
For both the infants and the adults, several kinematic measures were computed.
Reach onset times and grasp times were used to isolate the portions of the Optotrak data that
were relevant for each reach. The velocity of the hand (mm/sec) was computed from the hand
position files collected from the Optotrak starting with data at the onset of the reach and
ending at contact with the ball. From these velocity profiles of the hand during the reach for
the object, the average speed and the peak speed (the highest speed achieved during the reach)
for each reach was calculated. In addition, percent peak was determined as the percentage of
total duration of the reach where the peak speed occurred. Additional measures allowed us to
look at the acceleration and deceleration portions of the reach. For instance, onset to peak was
a duration measure for the amount of time spent from reach onset to the point at which peak
speed was achieved. We considered this to be the overall acceleration portion of the reach. In
addition, peak to grasp was a duration measure for the amount of time spent from the point in
the reach where the peak speed was achieved to the grasping of the object. We considered this
to be the overall deceleration portion of the reach, fri all of these analyses we ignored the
smaller peaks that occurred throughout the reaching profile.
We also used 3 different distance measures to calculate the distance which was
fraveled as well as the overall straightness of the reaching motion: distance fraveled, sfraight
line distance, and ratio distance. Overall distance fraveled is a measure that combines both the
forward distance fraveled with the up-down distance fraveled in order to determine the amount
of distance traveled in 3D space. Sfraight-line distance was computed by subtracting the
location in 2D space where the reach started from the 2D location where the object was
grasped, and thus the distance between then object and the starting point of the hand. The
ratio distance is a measure of how sfraight the reach was, with a 1 .0 being a perfectly sfraight
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reach. This measure was calculated by dividing the distance traveled by the straight-line
distance.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
The goal of this study was to determine whether intentional reaching behavior in
infants can be measured using kinematics. Thus, we used two adult studies which measured
intentional reaching behavior m adults as the basis for our study design and our hypothesized
outcomes. We had two primary questions of interest. First, we wanted to compare the
kinematics of the reach toward the object for those reaches which resulted in a fit and those
reaches that resulted in a throw as was done with adults in Marteniuk et al. (1987). Secondly,
we wanted to compare the kinematics of the reach toward the object for reaches which
resulted in a hold (no second action) and those reaches that resulted in either a fit or a throw
(second action) as was done with adults in Johnson et al. (submitted). Thus, we had two
additional comparisons, a hold-fit comparison and a hold-throw comparison. The three
primary dependent measures of interest for these questions of interest were reach duration
time, (time from reach onset to contact with the object), peak-to-grasp time (the decelerative
portion of the reach between peak speed and grasping the object) and speed of the reach.
These were the three measures predicted to be statistically different for our fit-throw
comparison and our hold-fit and hold-throw comparisons as was shown in Marteniuk et al.
and Johnson et al respectively. Several additional kinematic parameters were analyzed for the
reach to the ball, such as time from onset to peak, as well as 3 distance measures (shaight-line
distance, distance traveled, and ratio distance). These additional parameters provided us with
a more complete picture of the reach kinematics for the three comparisons.
The data we used in our kinematic analyses fulfilled certain criteria discussed
previously in the methods section, namely that only 1 to 6 trials for each infant for each
condition were included in the preliminary analyses. Also, in order to be included in the
analyses in general, each infant had to contribute at least 1 trial each to 2 out of the 3
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conditions (fitting, throwing, or holding). Thus, out of the number of original participants (30
infants), 21 infants met these criteria.
The first analysis was essential to determining which specific actions to include in our
analyses. As discussed previously in the methods section, actions which the infants performed
with the ball fell into 3 main categories: fitting, throwing, and holding, as well as into two
subcategories: tube (when the infant placed the ball at the opening of the tube but did not
release it) and drop (when the infant simply released the ball by opening up the fingers
enclosing the ball as opposed to a vigorous throwing motion). We wanted to determine
whether or not these subcategories, tube and drop, were significantly different from fitting and
throwing, respectively. We wanted to determine if we should analyze these actions of tube
and drop separately, or if we could include them in the fitting and throwing conditions for the
remainder of our analyses.
Using independent samples t-tests, we compared the kinematics of fitting and tube,
and of throwing and drop. For these comparisons, all of the trials were included, such that
each infant contributed all available trials to the analyses and all 21 infants were included.
There were no significant differences between the fitting and tube conditions (see Table 2) or
between the throwing and drop conditions (see Table 3). Thus, as there were no significant
differences between the fit and tube trials, or the throw and drop trials, we decided to combine
them, respecfively. Accordingly, for the subsequent analyses, the fitting condition is a
combination of fit and tube trials and the throwing condition is a combination of throw and
drop trials.
Our preliminary analyses consisted of paired t-tests in which each infant contributed
mean values for each appropriate condition, with the mean being calculated from up to 3 trials
for that condition from each infant. Thus, for example, subject 4, contributed one mean for
each kinematic measure to the hold condition, to the fit condition, and so forth. In our
preliminary analyses we also only included those infants who contributed data to both
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Table 2
Comparison of the Infant Fit and Tube Actions
Fit (n=56) Tube (n=ll) t dl PDuration
(msec)
755 00 (214) U.z4U 65 >0.05
Peak Speed
(mm/s)
387.36 (141) 65 >0.05
Percent Peak
(%)
47.42 (28) 51.40 (29) -0.427 65 >0.05
Average Speed
(mm/s)
214.46 (78) 219.35 (74) -0.191 65 >0.05
Onset to Peak
(msec)
371.98 (267) 389.17 (265) -0.195 65 >0.05
Peak to Grasp
(msec)
383.02 (241) 345.38 (223) 0.480 65 >0.05
Ratio Dist.
(mm)
1.41 (0.58) 1.66 (0.66) -1.249 65 >0.05
Straight-line
Distance (mm)
116.38 (49) 103.35 (37) 0.830 65 >0.05
Distance
Traveled (mm)
155.20 (61) 158.86 (47) -0.189 65 >0.05
Table 3
Comparison of the Infant Throw and Drop Actions
Throw
(n=22)
Drop
("=25)
t dl P
Duration
(msec)
854.55 (369) 1034.4 (528) -1.335 45 >0.05
Peak Speed
(mm/s)
551.24 (229) 504.35 (321) 0.569 45 >0.05
Percent Peak
(%)
44.26 (27) 43.64 (26) 0.079 45 >0.05
Average Speed
(mm/s)
282.49(106) 243.96(117) 1.178 45 >0.05
Onset to Peak
(msec)
344.54 (195) 432.06(363) -1.009 45 >0.05
Peak to Grasp
(msec)
510.01 (407) 602.34 (455) -0.729 45 >0.05
Ratio Dist.
(mm)
1.60 (0.42) 1.54 (0.60) 0.379 45 >0.05
Straight-line
Distance (mm)
143.75 (44) 151.42 (68) -0.452 45 >0.05
Distance
Traveled (mm)
222.01 (72) 220.01 (99) 0.078 45 >0.05
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conditions being compared, thus we had a n of 12 for the fit-throw comparison and the hold-
throw comparison and a n of 1 5 for the hold-fit comparison, out of a total possible of 1 8 fits,
15 throws, and 18 holds.
We noticed in doing preliminary analyses on the three different comparisons of fit-
throw, hold-throw, and hold-fit, that distance vaned significantly with condition. Although
we were not interested in distance as a vanable, distance can affect speed, duration, and the
peak-to-grasp measure, which was of primary interest. For the hold-fit comparison t(14) =
2.971, p < 0.05, such that the straight-line distance in the hold condition (M = 152mm, SD -
47) was significantly longer than in the fit condifion (M = 1 12, SD = 41). While the hold-
throw comparison, t(l 1) = 0.627, p>0.05, and the fit-throw comparison t(l 1) = 1.842, p >0.05,
straight-line distances were not statistically different, both the small degrees of freedom in
addition to the variableness of the data, led us to the decision that the straight-line distance
needed to be stafistically controlled for in all three comparisons (hold-throw means: hold M =
143, SD = 32, throw M = 136, SD = 38; fit-throw means: fit M = 1 1 1, SD = 46, throw M =
138, SD = 43). Thus, because of the confound in the data, we decided to statistically control
for distance as a covariate in a repeated-measures ANCOVA design in all of the analyses
below.
A. Comparing Fitfing vs. Throwing for Infants
One of our primary questions of interest was to compare the kinematics for the fitting
and throwing conditions to see if task precision demands affected kinemafics as had been
shown by the Marteniuk et al. adults. In order to analyze these data we used a repeated
measures ANCOVA with straight-line distance as the covariate'. Whereas our preliminary
' We used multiple regression analyses because of the unbalanced nature of the data as suggested by
Neter and Wasserman (1974; Applied Linear Stochastic Models, Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin,
Inc.) and Bogartz (1994; An introduction to the analysis of variance. Westport, Ct.: Praeger.). BMDP
program 3V (BMDP Statistical Software, Inc) provided restricted maximum likelihood estimates of the
regression parameters and F-tests were generated from the estimated parameters and their covariance
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analyses used a paired t-test means procedure, we choose to use an unbalanced repeated
measures ANCOVA design in order to have a more powerful statistical analysis which
included more of our data. Thus, data from all 21 infants contributed to the analysis, with
each infant contnbuting up to 3 trials. Each infant contnbuted data to either the fit condition,
or the throw condition, or to both. Thus, 40 out of 67 fit trials and 34 out of 47 throw trials
were included m the analyses. The means and standard deviations for fitting and throwing, as
well as the statistics are provided in Table 4.
Unlike Marteniuk's adults, for duration time and the peak to grasp portion of the
reach, we found no significant difference between fitting and throwing. However, for peak
speed, our infants matched Marteniuk's adults such that there was a significant difference in
peak speed for throwing and fitfing; F(l, 67) = 4.69, p<0.05. The peak speed for throwing (M
= 527mm/sec, SD = 3 15) was faster than the peak speed for fitting (M = 394mm/sec, SD =
135). In addition, we found a significant difference between the average speeds for the fitting
and throwing reaches; F(l
,
67) = 4.89, p<0.05. Thus, the average speed for throwing (M =
253mm/sec, SD = 113) was faster than the average speed for fitting (M = 201 mm/sec, SD -
70). The distance traveled was also significant, F(l, 67) = 5.32, p<0.05. Thus, the path that
the hand traveled through space was longer in the throw condition (M = 226miTi, SD = 95)
than in the fitting condition (M = 155, SD = 60). Thus, our infants reached significantly faster
when they were going to reach for a ball and throw it than when they were going to reach for a
ball and fit it down a tube (see Figure 2).
B. Comparing Second Action vs. No-second Action for Infants
In order to analyze these data we used a repeated measures ANCOVA with straight-
line distance as the covariate. Data from all 21 infants contributed to the analysis, with each
infant contributing up to 3 trials to the hold condition and/or to the fit/throw conditions. Thus,
matrix. In this case, the error degrees of freedom are the difference between the total degrees of
freedom and the number of parameters that are estimated.
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40 out of 47 hold trials, 40 out of 67 fit trials, and 34 out of 47 throw trials were included
the analysis.
600
peak speed
S average speed
throw fit
Conditions
Figure 2. Speed comparisons for fit and throw.
Table 4
ANCOVA (Co-Varving Straight-Line Distance) for the Infant Fit-Throw Comparisons
Fit
(n=40)
Tlirow
(n=34)
F df P
Duration (msec) 788 (253) 1001 (473) 2.20 1,67 n.s.
Peak Speed
(mm/s)
394 (135) 527 (315) 4.69 1, 67 0.034
% Peak 51 (29) 44 (28) 0.53 1, 67 n.s.
Ave. Speed
(mm/s)
201 (70) 253 (113) 4.89 L 67 0.030
Onset to Peak
(msec)
410 (275) 421 (337) 0.01 1, 67 n.s.
Peak to Grasp
(msec)
378 (257) 580 (426) 2.08 1, 67 n.s.
Distance
Traveled (mm)
155 (60) 226 (95) 5.32 1, 67 0.024
Straight Line
Distance (mm)
109 (47) 146 (60)
Ratio Distance 1.5 (0.7) 1.6(0.6) 1.75 1, 67 n.s.
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We wanted to determine whether or not there were any differences in the kinematic
measures for duration, deceleration time, and percent peak speed between the second action (a
fit or a throw) and the no-second action conditions (a hold) as had been found for adults in
Johnson et al. The means and standard deviations as well as the statistics for the various
kinematic measures are provided in Table 5 for the hold-fit comparison and in Table 6 for the
hold-throw comparison. For duration time, there was a marginal difference between hold-fit
(F(l, 75)= 3.81, p=0.054) and a marginal difference between hold-throw (F(l, 75) = 3.74).
Thus, as in Johnson et al., the reach duration that preceded holding the ball (M = 11 07msec,
SD =692) was longer than when it preceded a fit action (M = 788msec, SD = 253) or a throw
action (M = 1001msec, SD = 473). However, there was no significant difference for the
deceleration measure or the percent peak speed for either comparison. However, there was a
significant difference not predicted by Johnson et al. The peak speed for the hold-throw
comparison was significant, F(l, 64) = 5.30, p<0.05, such that the peak speed for the throw
condifion (M = 527mm/s, SD = 315) was faster than m the hold condition (M = 448mm/s, SD
= 200). This difference was true for the hold-throw comparison, but not for the hold-fit
comparison. Lastly, the distance traveled for the hold-fit comparison was significant, F(l
,
75)
= 6.23, such that the distance the hand traveled in space was farther in the hold condition (M =
218mm, SD = 72) than m the fit condition (M = 155, SD = 60).
Thus, the duration time of the inifial reach was longer for when there was no second
acfion (hold condition) than when there was a second action (fit or throw) as was found with
adults in Johnson et al (see Figure 3). However, the difference in peak to grasp (while in the
right direction) and in percent peak found in Johnson et al. adults were not found in our
infants.
42
Table 5
(with Straight-Line Distance as Covariate) for the H^i d-Fit Compari
Hold (n=40) Fit (n=40"» r at PDuration (msec) 1107 (692) 788 (253) 3.81 1,75 0.054
Peak Speed
(mm/s)
448 (200) 394 (135) 0.12 1, 75 U.S.
% Peak 44 (26) 51 (29) 0.02 1, 75 n.s,
Ave. Speed
(mni/s)
242 (127) 201 (70) 0.30 1, 75 n.s.
Onset to Peak
(msec)
471 (416) 410 (275) 1.45 1,75 n.s.
Peak to Grasp
(msec)
636 (563) 378 (257) 1.63 1, 75 n.s.
Distance
Traveled (mm)
218 (72) 155 (60) 6.23 1, 75 0.015
Straight Line
Distance (mm)
150(51) 109 (47)
Ratio Distance 1.5 (0.3) 1.5 (0.7) 1.97 1,75 n.s.
Table 6
ANCQVA (with Straight-Line Distance as Covariate) for the Hold-Throw Comparisons
Hold (n=40) Throw
(n=34)
F df P
Duration (msec) 1107 (692) 1001 (473) 3.74 1, 64 0.057
Peak Speed
(mm/s)
448 (200) 527 (315) 5.30 1, 64 0.025
% Peak 44 (26) 44 (28) 0.26 1, 64 n.s.
Ave. Speed
(mm/s)
242 (127) 253 (113) 3.04 1, 64 n.s.
Onset to Peak
(msec)
471 (416) 421 (337) 0.52 1, 64 n.s.
Peak to Grasp
(msec)
636(563) 580 (426) 2.98 1, 64 n.s.
Distance
Traveled (mm)
218 (72) 226 (95) 1.38 1, 64 n.s.
Straight Line
Distance (mm)
150(51) 146 (60)
Ratio Distance 1.5(0.3) 1.6(0.6) 1.40 1, 64 n.s.
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Figure 3. Duration comparisons for hold, fit, and throw.
Figure 4 illustrates sample speed profiles for second action and no-second action from
two different infants.) These speed profiles exemplify how duration time is longer in the hold
condition than for the fit or tlirow conditions. Also, infant 2 illustrates how the peak speed is
higher in the throwing than in the holding condition.
C. Adult Reach Kinematics Comparisons on Action
Unless otherwise noted, the dependent measures for the adult analyses were done
using a 3 (Acfion: holding, fitting, throwing) by 3 (Object: disk, small ball, large ball)
repeated measures ANOVA design and the pairwise comparisons of the means were done
using Bonferroni t-tests.
Table 7 presents a summary of the means and the statistical analyses for the 10 adult
participants. For the effects of action on reach kinemafics in the adults, there was a main effect
of durafion, F(2,16) = 21.188, p<0.001. Pairwise comparisons were significant for holding-
fitfing, holding-throwing, and throwing-fitting. Thus, the duration time for holding
(M=756msec) was longer than fitting (M=70 1msec), and holding and fitting had longer
movement time durations than throwing (M=63 1msec). In agreement with Marteniuk,
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Figure 4. Speed profiles from two infants for second and no-second action conditions.
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duration for fitting was longer than for throwing. There was also a main effect for % peak,
F(2,16)= 8.661, p<0.003. A pairwise comparison showed that the % peak for fitting (M =
47%) was greater than the % peak for holdmg (M=41%). Thus, the peak speed for fitting
occurred later in the reach than the peak speed for holding.
There was also a main effect for average speed, F(2,16)= 12.4, p<0.001. The pairwise
comparisons were marginally significant, such that the average speed for holding (M=
508mm/s), for fittmg (M =537mm/s), and for throwmg (M = 589mm/s) were all significantly
different from each other. Thus, adults were reaching fastest when their ultimate goal was to
throw the ball, and slowest when their ulfimate goal was to just hold the ball.
There was also a main effect for the peak to grasp measure, F(2,16)= 22.204, p<0.001. The
pairwise comparisons were significant for holding (M = 446msec) and fitting (M = 376msec)
and for holding (M = 446msec) and throwing (M = 332msec). Thus, as predicted by Johnson
et al.'s findings with adults, when not performing a second action (the holding condition), the
adults spent a longer portion of the reach in deceleration than when they did perform a second
action (fitting or throwing), hiteresfingly though, this result does not replicate Marteniuk et
al.'s adults, as there is no significant difference between the fitting and throwing decelerations.
However, the means are in the correct direction with the fitting decelerafion portion of the
reach (M = 376 msec) longer than the throwing deceleration portion of the reach (M = 332
msec).
The three distance measures were non-significant. Thus, the distance between the ball
and the adults' starting position was the same in all three conditions. In addition, the up/down
distance traveled was similar in all 3 conditions.
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Table 7
Mean Effect of Action on Reach Kinematics for Adults
Measures
conditions
Hold Fit Throw
Statistics
F df
Duration (msec)
Holding-fitting **
Holding-throwing **
Throwing-fitting *
756 701 631 21.188 2, 16
P
0,000
Peak Speed (mm/s) 1187 1182 1240 0.435 2, 16 n.s.
% Peak
Holding-throwing**
41 47 48 8.661 2, 16 0.003
Ave. Speed (mm/s)
Holding-fitting
'
Holding-throwing **
508 537 589 12.4 2, 16 0.001
Fitting-throwing
'
Onset to Peak (msec) 310 325 298 2.36 2, 16 n.s.
Peak to Grasp (msec)
Holding-fitting **
446 376 332 22.204 2, 16 0.001
Holding-throwing **
Distance Traveled (mm) 380 375 373 0.304 2, 16 n.s.
Straight Line Dist. (mm) 309 314 305 1.815 2, 16 n.s.
Ratio Distance 1.23 1.19 1.22 1.471 2, 16 n.s.
= marginally significant,* = p<0.05, ** = p<0.01
D. Adult Reach Kinematic Comparisons on Object-size
There were also some main effects of object-size which are summarized in Table 8.
In general, object size did influence the kinematics of the initial reach for the object when the
type of action was controlled for and there were no interactions between object size and action
type. Our reasoning behind giving the adults 3 different ball sizes was to see if the hand to
object-size ratio would have a significant effect, which it did not. Generally, the size results
agree with Fitts Law (Fitts, 1954) in that one reaches more slowly for smaller objects.
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Table 8
Mean Effect of Object Size on Reach Kinematics for AHnlt.
Objects
Statistics
Measures Disk Small Ball Large Ball F dr P
Duration (msec) 730 683 677 3.063 2, 16 n.s.
Peak Speed (mm/s) 914 1136 1 JH-H 4./ZV I, 16 0.034
% Pealc
disk-small ball
'
disk-large ball *
40 46 49 ) 1 A/, 1 0 0.006
Ave. Speed (mm/s)
disk-small ball **
disk-large ball **
small ball-large ball
'
469 547 618 19.5 7 ] (, 0 on 1W.Uu 1
Onset to Peak (msec) 292 311 330 2.98 2, 16 n.s.
Peak to Grasp (msec)
Hlcl/" cmoM V\Qn ^UlbK-bllldll UdU
disk-large ball *
438 372 343 22.204 2, 16 0.008
Distance Traveled (mm)
disk-large ball *
small ball-large ball
'
336 371 421 8.429 2, 16 0.003
Straight Line Dist. (mm) 298 308 321 3.24 2, 16 n.s.
Ratio Distance 1.13 1.2 1.3 10.809 2, 16 0.001
disk-large ball *
small ball-large ball
marginally significant, * = p<0.05, ** = p<0.01
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
In the past, measuring intention in infants has proved to be a problematic endeavor. In
part, this difficulty lies in the fact that one cannot use the end outcome of events in order to
determine whether an action occurred intentionally. Accordingly, an act that looks intentional,
might not have actually been intentional, but rather was part of a causal relationship (e.g.,
Frye, 1990; Vedeler, 1987, 1991). hi addition, as mfants cannot verbally explain what they
had in mind before they performed or did not perform some action, it is up to the researcher to
find ways in which to quantify their intentional behaviors. Research with adults suggests that
this quantifying of intention can be accomplished using kinematic measures (e.g., Runeson &
Frykholm, 1981, 1983; Marteniuk et al., 1987; Johnson et al., submitted), and we suggest that
this procedure can be used with infants as well.
One way in which kinematics have been used to measure intention in adults is by
measuring movement intent (Marteniuk et al., 1987). Marteniuk et al. described movement
intent as being what one intends to do with an object after he/she picks it up, and how this
intention affects the kinematics of the initial reach for the object. Marteniuk et al. has shown
that when an adult plans or intends to do a precise action with an object, such as fitting an
object down a small hole, the duration of that initial reach for the object will be longer than if
the adult plans on doing a less precise action with the object, such as throwing an object into a
large bucket. In addition, Marteniuk et al. found that for the fitting action, a larger portion of
the approach toward the object was spent decelerating and peak hand speed was lower than
when the approach preceded a throwing action.
Another approach to theorizing about how the goal of an action affects the reaching
kinematics can be broached in terms of context effects. Similar to the idea of movement
intent, context effects can also predict that what one intends to do with an object after it is
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picked up affects the kinematics of the initial reach toward the object (Johnson ct al.,
submitted). While Johnson et al. were unable to support Marteniuk's precision argument, they
found that whether one intends to transport an object to a new location, as opposed to keeping
an object in the same location, affects the kinematics of the reach toward the object.
Specifically, the duration of the reach is longer in the no transport condition than in the
transport condition. In addition, the portion of the reach spent in deceleration is longer when
the object will be held rather than subsequently transported. Johnson et al. claimed that these
differences in duration time and deceleration times were caused by the goal specificity of the
tasks. Specifically, they argued that because the goal of the no transport task is much less
specific than the transport task, that more time for the reach is needed and that this is reflected
in the deceleration portion of the reach.
The goal of the current study was to see if what the infant was going to do with the
object after he/she picked it up affected how he/she reached for the object as has been
demonstrated with adults. Thus, what the infant planned to do with the object, the infant's
goal, should be evident in the kinematics of the reach for the object. We expected to replicate
Marteniuk et al.'s findings using a task more similar to that used with his adults than Johnson
et al. used. Consequently, we wanted to see if precision task demands did affect the
kinematics of the reach toward the object. Specifically, we expected to see a lengthening of
the duration time and the deceleration time in the reach for the object in our fitting condition
as compared to our throwing condition. In addition, we expected to see a higher peak velocity
in our throwing condition as compared to our fitting condition. We also expected to be able
to replicate Johnson et al.'s findings that moving an object to a second location (which we
labeled as a planned second action) would affect the kinematics of the reach toward the object
differently than if the object was not moved to a different location after it was picked up
(which we labeled as no-second action). Specifically, we expected to see a shortening of the
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duration time and the deceleration time in the reach for the object in our fitting and throwing
conditions as compared to our holding condition.
The results of our adults and our infants for fitting vs. throwing arc summarized in
Table 9. We were able to replicate Marteniuk et al.'s precision task demands with peak
velocity effects on the kinematics of reaching with our infants and for length of duration l.mc
with our adults. However we were unable to either replicate the duration time results with
infants or the peak to grasp time with either our infants or adults.
Table 9
Summary Table for Fitting vs. Throwing Actions
our
Marteniuk et al. Our Infants Our Adults
Duration Time FIT LONGHR NO DIFFERENCE FIT LONGin<
Velocity I'llROW HIGHER THROW HIGHER THROW HIGHER
Onset to Peak NO DIFFHRENCI- NO DIFFERENCE NO DIFFERENCE
Peak to Grasp FIT LONGIiR NO DIFFERENCE NO DIFFERENCE
% Peak THROW HIGHER NO DIFFERENCE THROW HIGHER
One explanation for our having different findings from Marteniuk et al. could pertain
to reaching in general. The adults in the Marteniuk et al. study were instructed to reach as
quickly as possible for the object. Infants, obviously, would not understand such an
instruction, and reach at their own pace, which in turn would affect their reach kinematics.
Marteniuk et al.'s instructions to reach quickly for a small object could have accentuated the
differences in the reaching kinematics for the two conditions, thus finding differences lhat
only occur when adults are reaching quickly.
The one finding that we did replicate of Marteniuk et al.'s for our infants was the
velocity measure differences. Like Marteniuk et al, our infants were reaching for the ball
faster in the throw condition than in the fit condition, 'fhus, at least on one critical dimension
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the kinematics of the approach to the object were affected by what the infant planned to do
with the object after he/she picked it up.
The resuhs of our adults and our infants for second planned action vs. no-second
planned action are summarized m Table 10. Our infants and adults had a longer movement
duration time for the reach to the object when they did not perform a planned second action
(our holding condition), which matches Johnson et al.'s adult findings. However, the infants
did not have a longer peak to grasp time for the initial reach when they simply grasped and
held the ball. While the differences in percentages were not significant, Ihcy were m Ihc right
direction, with the percent peak occurring earlier in the unplanned condition compared to the
planned condition. Thus, our infants only partially replicated the adult findings that whether
or not the individual plans to perform a second action of transporting an object to a new
location is reflected in the kinematics of the reach for that object.
Table 10
Summary Table for Second Planned vs. No-second Planned Actions
Johnson et al. Our Infants Our Adults
Duration Time NO-SECOND ACTION
LONGER
NO-SECOND ACTION
LONGER
NO-SECOND
ACTION LONGER
Velocity NO DIFFERENCE THROW FAS PER
THAN HOLD
NO DIFFERENCE
Onset to Peak NO DIFFERENCE NO DIFFERENCE NO DIFFERENCE
Peak to Grasp NO-SECOND ACTION
LONGER
NO DIFFERENCE NO-SECOND
ACTION LONGER
% Peak NO-SECOND ACTION
SMALLER
NO DIFFERENCE NO-SECOND
ACTION SMALLER
One criticism of our finding of kinematic differences between second and no-second
action is that our holding condition always occurred first in the testing session and therefore
was not counterbalanced with the fitting and throwing conditions. Our reasoning behind
always giving the infants the hold trials first in session was because we were concerned that
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the infant might find holding "boring" in the later trials, and would be doing something else
with the ball instead, such as throwing. However, always presenting the hold condition first
could have potentially confounded our data. It could have been that reaches at the beginning
of the testing session were slower on average than reaches at the ending of the testing session
regardless of condition. Thus, our differences in duration should be interpreted with caution.
Only a between-subjects design m which order was counterbalanced would this confound be
solved.
Controlling the distance between the object and the infant was a problem for all three
comparisons. It is difficult to control for the distance between the object and the infant partly
because some of the infants would not reach for the ball unless it was placed fairly close to
them. Also, unlike adults, whose reaching distance abilities are easy to judge, infants'
reaching distance abilities are highly variable. In addition, unlike with adults, we could not
control the starting point of the infants' hands. Thus, the starting position was not consistent
over trials. The only solution to this problem is to continue to look for possible differences
between conditions as we have done. Later, if differences in distance between the object and
the infant occur, then one can try various ways to control for it such as statistically controlling
for it m an ANCOVA.
In looking at both our fit-throw comparison findings and our second action- no-second
action comparison findings, we note that movement intent is reflected in some aspects of the
kinematics of infant reaching as it is in adults, but not in all. Specifically, velocity appears to
be the most sensitive parameter of the reaching movement to the infant's upcoming action.
Task precision affected speed of infants' movement in the same way as it does in adults -
faster reaches when the upcoming movement is not precise. Likewise, velocity reflected the
infant's intention to proceed with a second action once the object was in hand, even though
this was not seen in our adults or in Johnson et al. (submitted). The longer decelerative phase,
which is a hallmark of adult kinematics in this situation, did not appear in infants' reaching.
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The immaturity of the infant's motor control is a likely explanation for this partial similarity
adult reaching. At lO-months of age, we see the beginning of how intentionality is reflected
the kinematics of reaching. It could be that at 10.5-months, infant reaching is too highly
variable and that an older age group, such as 12-month olds who have had much more
experience with fitting and throwing, might have less variable results with additional
kinematic measures reflecting intentionality. In addition, while most infants had no trouble
with the fitting task (perhaps because it had a more specific goal), not as many infants were
willing to throw the ball, hi fact, unexpectedly, many parents casually reported that their
children dropped toys from their highchairs infrequently, or not at all. By 12-months, both
fitting and throwing should be more highly practiced behaviors that infants will find easier to
perform when encouraged.
While this study did not fully replicate the findings on intentionality of reaching in
adults, the main goal was sfill accomplished, finding a new measure of intentionality in
infants. We did find that infants reached for the ball faster if they were going to subsequently
throw the ball as opposed to fitting the ball. Thus, the infants were exhibiting intentional
behavior such that they had some sort of representafion of the future state of events (fitting or
throwing the ball) that was not available from immediate perception. This finding adds a
deeper dimension to the early reaching behavior literature on prospective control by
examining future-oriented behavior that has a definite plan in mind. Previous prospective
control studies were able to show that infants adjust their speed (von Hofsten, 1991), orient
their hand (e.g. Lockman, Ashmead, and Bushnell, 1984), and prepare grip size (von Hofsten
and Ronnqvist, 1988) when reaching for a particularly oriented and shaped object. Our study
goes one step further by demonstrating that when the object is perceptually the same, infants
will adjust their speed reaching for that object depending on what they intend to do with the
object after they pick it up. Therefore, instead of manipulating the object itself as was done in
the prospective control studies, we left the object constant and instead manipulated what the
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child would do with that object after it was picked up. The prospective conti'ol studies
demonstrated that mfants are reliable in how they reach for objects depending on its
perceptual features. Thus, since the reach for a perceptually identical object was different in
our throw and fit condition, we can interpret this difference as due to what the infant intended
to do with the object after it was picked up and not the visual stimulus.
In addition, this intentional behavior, while less complex than the traditional means-
ends studies, achieves what the traditional studies have not. The traditional means-ends
studies rely on success or failure of the task as a measure of intentionality (Fyre, 1990;
Vedeler, 1987, 1991) which can be problematic. Just because a child succeeds on a traditional
means-ends task, does not necessarily mean that he/she retrieved the object intentionally. The
successful retrieval of the object could have been due to chance. Failure, too, is not
necessarily indicative of unintentional behavior. For instance, the child could intend to
retrieve the toy, but not have the skills to bring about the intended retrieval of the toy. Our
study avoids this problem by using a new measure of intentionality: reaching kinematics.
Thus, we have found that as was suggested by Vedeler (1987, 1991), using the
infant's behavior as it is directed toward objects and assessing this behavior using the infant's
behavioral dynamics, such as the kinematics of the infant's reach toward the object can be an
informative measure of reaching intent. Thus, the infant's intention of what he/she is going
with an object after it is picked up affects the motor plan for the reach of that object
differently, depending the infant's final goal. Thus, kinematic research provides us with an
interesting way of quantifying intentional reaching behaviors in infants.
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APPENDIX A
CODING GUIDELINES AND ISSUES FOR SCORING REACHES ON VIDEOTAPE
> Reach: Stands for reaches for the ball
> Condition: Reach, Throw, Fit
> OPTOTRAK:
1
.
OPTO # corresponds to the optotrak trial # on the protocol sheet. If the entire
reach trial is not within an optotrak trial, then write unmarked trial and do not
score times.
2. Y or N, whether the OPTOTRAK light is on tliroughout the entire reach trial.
Code as Y, if the light remains on until the infant touches the ball; otherwise code
as N. If N, indicate why in the comments; i.e. too early (to indicate that reach
occurred before OPTO came on) or too late (to indicate that OPTO went off during
the reach) and do not score times.
> Grasp Hand: Hand which grasps the ball
> Action Hand: Hand which does the action, i.e. the hand used for throwing or
fitting.
> Actions (examples)
Fit (releases ball down tube)
Drop (the hand holding the ball releases the ball onto ground by opening the
fingers around the ball)
Throw (the hand raises upward and forces the ball to the ground)
Switch (moves ball from grasp hand to other hand)
Held (just holds in hands for 3 to 4+ sec)
Mouth (brings ball to mouth)
Clap (clapping with ball in hands)
Tube (brings ball to opening of tube, but doesn't release it into the tube)
Play (grabs tube with other hand and plays with it)
Switch - drop (first switched hands and then dropped)
Switch - fit (first switched hands and then fit)
Mouth - fit (first brings ball to mouth and then fits)
Held - fit (first holds ball and then fits)
> Trial Onset: First frame when red light appears
> Reach Onset: First continuous forward movement toward the ball that does not
reverse or stop and results in contact with the ball.
> Grasp Time: Time at which infant's hands first wrap around the ball. When you
first see the fingers getting in a curved position.
> Release Time: Time at which the ball leaves the infants hands such that the fingers
holding the ball open. The frame in which the infant is no longer touching the ball
with the hand that initially grabbed it. Only score release if the infant fit, threw, or
held the ball (before a second action).
What if the infant first reaches for the tube, and then reaches for the ball?
If the infant does not retract the hand again into its body, then write down the
time of the second reach, so the reach onset would be the time at which the
hand leaves the tube and starts for the ball. Place note in comments (reach
from tube)
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Reach
#
Condition
OPTO
#;
y/n
Grasp
Hd
Action
Hd
Actions
Trial
Onset
Reach Onset
Grasp
Time
Release
Time
CM
CO
CD
00
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APPENDIX B
TRIALS CONTRIBUTED BY EACH INFANT IN EACH CATEGORY OF
BEHAVIOR
# of fits #
OPTO
#of
throws
#OPTO
throws
Not included
1 4 3 2 1 4 2
^^^^^^^^^^
2 5 2 1 0 5 2
3 8 4 13 6 0 0
4 3 3 13 10 6 6
5
Refused IREDS
6
fussy
7 11 1 8 3 1 0
8 5 0 1 1 7 5
9 7 2 4 1 0 0
10 5 2 7 6 0 0
11
Missing IREDS
12 3 1 6 2 9 1
13 0 0 1 1 8 3
14 0 0 8 7 1 1
15 Missing IREDS
16 9 9 3 2 10 5
17 Fussy
18 6 3 3 3 0 0
19 Fussy
20 Missing IREDS
21 3 2 15 9 15 10
22 Premature
23 6 1 9 1 9 5
24 4 4 17 16 2 0
25 5 2 16 0 4 1
26 2 2 15 14 2 2
27 8 4 15 12 8 4
28 4 1 11 4 1 1
29 Fussy
30 4 4 0 0 11 3
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